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THE PRESS AND BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY: BRAZIL’S 
PARTICIPATION AT THE 1962 PUNTA DEL ESTE CONFERENCE 
Ana Carolina Marson1 
 
Abstract: This paper seeks to comprehend how a portion of the Brazilian public opinion, 
specifically the press, understood Brazil’s participation in the Eighth Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962 – the Punta 
del Este Conference. This was a decisive meeting since it culminated in the expulsion of Cuba 
from the Organization of American States (OAS), because of the pressure exerted by the United 
States. Brazil distinguished itself for leading a group of countries against Cuba’s expulsion, 
based on the principle of self-determination and non-intervention. Although some authors 
believe the Punta del Este Conference to be the first event to massively mobilize the Brazilian 
public opinion around a foreign policy issue, they are not clear about what they understand as 
the concept of public opinion or how it positioned itself about Brazil’s participation in the 
Conference. Thus, this paper focuses on the coverage of three newspapers of national 
circulation (Jornal do Brasil, O Estado de São Paulo and Última Hora) between November 1961 
and March 1962 to understand, through a content analysis method, how the press evaluated 
Brazil’s participation in the Punta del Este Conference. The results point to a bigger support of 
the Brazilian position and the Independent Foreign Policy. 






The beginning of the 1960s was a crucial time in Brazilian history. The governments of 
Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (1961-1964) were marked by economic problems, political 
impasses and the growing participation of social movements in the public sphere. The large 
external debt left by the Kubitschek administration (1956-1961) – two billion dollars –, the 
rising inflation and the deterioration of the commercial balance hampered Brazil’s chance of 
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getting new international loans (Skidmore 1988, 240). The political arena was as unstable as 
the economic one. Seven months after his inauguration, Jânio Quadros resigned from the 
country’s presidency starting a deep political crisis. Part of the military ministers tried to 
prevent Vice President João Goulart from arising to power, given his leftist inclinations 
(Skidmore 1988, 252). Goulart’s inauguration was only possible due to a compromise of both 
sides, installing a short-term parliamentarism – in January 1963 a referendum would reinstate 
presidentialism. Another aspect of this period stressed by scholars is the intensity of the social 
conflicts that, according to some, had reached unprecedented levels (Loureiro, 2016).2 
The first half of the 1960s was also a crucial moment for Brazilian foreign policy. 
Academics recognize the impact that both Quadros’ and Goulart’s administrations had on 
Brazilian foreign policy. Although it was reverted after the 1964 military coup, this policy had 
relevant imprints on Brazil’s international policy (Storrs 1973, Manzur 2009).3 The 
Independent Foreign Policy (IFP) – as it came to be known – was created during Jânio Quadros’ 
electoral campaign and developed throughout his short term (January – August 1961). This 
foreign policy intended to be more independent from the United States, which meant improving 
Brazilian relations with socialist countries and establishing bonds with recently independent 
countries, mainly African ones (Storrs 1973, 252). 
The Independent Foreign Policy believed in the non-intervention and self-determination 
principles. Government officials argued that in order to play a bigger role in international peace 
policies, Brazil needed to narrow its diplomatic relations with socialist countries, including the 
Soviet Union – with whom it had broken relations during Dutra’s administration in 1947 
(Skidmore 1988, 245; Dantas 1962, 7). This strategy would also give Brazil a chance to widen 
its international market; an essential step for the country economy, given the difficulties it faced 
at the moment (Loureiro 2017, cap. 1). Some of the IFP results that can be mentioned are the 
resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on November 1961 and the 
reestablishment of ties with countries of Eastern Europe, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania (Manzur 2009, 173).4 The Independent Foreign Policy is extremely important 
                                                     
2 For a further account about Brazil’s conjecture at the 1960s see Ferreira (2011, chapters 4-6), and 
Ferreira and Gomes (2007, chapters 4 e 5). 
3 Scholars recognize that the Brazilian foreign policy was already going through changes at the end of 
Juscelino Kubitschek’s administration, however the main ruptures happened at Quadros’ government. 
4 Besides seeking to expand Brazil’s commercial relations, the Independent Foreign Policy supported 
anti-colonialist policies, believed the country should be more active on international forums, reaffirmed 
Brazilian’s compatibility with the Inter-American system and defended the international disarmament 
(Manzur 2009, 81-82). For a comprehensive account of the IFP see Bandeira (1979: chapter 9) and 
Quadros (1961, 150-156). 
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since it radically changed Brazil’s traditional foreign policy line – automatic alignment with 
the United States.   
This article focuses on the Brazilian participation at the Punta del Este Conference to 
reflect on the relation between public opinion and foreign policy during the Goulart presidency. 
The period studied is of the utmost importance to the Brazilian foreign policy. Therefore, 
analyzing how the press saw this diversification on the traditionalist line the country used to 
follow on its foreign can shed light on current movements of Brazil’s public opinion. The 
comprehension of this connection is also important given that only few scholars studied this 
topic, and the ones that did left some gaps on their work. Academics in general, apart from 
Tânia Manzur (2009) 5, are not clear about what they understand as public opinion, how it 
manifested itself, what was its power over the policy makers and, specifically, which was its 
main position regarding Brazil’s participation at the Punta del Este Conference. Hence, by 
analyzing three newspapers of the time, this study intends to contribute to the foreign policy x 
public opinion debate.6 
 In this context, Brazil’s participation at the VII Foreign Ministers Consultation Meeting, 
also known as the Punta del Este Conference, Uruguay, on January 1962, was a milestone for 
the country’s foreign policy. At the beginning of the 1960s, Cuba, alongside western Berlin, 
had become one of U.S.’ main concerns. Even though Washington and Moscow had started an 
approximation process at the end of the 1950s, the presence of a communist country in the 
western Hemisphere was inadmissible to the Kennedy administration (Weaver 2014, 142). 
Thus, supported by the United States, Colombia7 asked the Organization of American States 
(OAS) council for a consultation meeting, as foreseen by the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance (Neto 2005, 2).8 This meeting aimed to get a declaration from Cuba 
                                                     
5 Manzur defines public opinion as “the set of different currents of ideas expressed in one place, in a 
determined time about one or more issues. These currents reveal perceptions, views of the world, 
concepts and prejudices, ideas and ideologies. To be considered public opinion it should have come to 
the public attention, or been published, once you can’t assess non-revealed opinions. It is also not about 
individual idiosyncrasies, since a current of thought can’t be measured by individuality.” (Manzur 2009, 
29).  
6 For further information about the Brazilian positions at the Punta del Este Conference see Amoroso 
Lima (1962, 5-16). 
7 Colombian policymakers were bothered by the actions of subversive groups on their territory and 
accused Cuba of training these subversive elements. 
8 The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio de Janeiro Treaty, was an 
agreement signed in 1947 establishing the Americas’ collective defense mechanism. Henceforth, any 
attack against one if its members was considered an attack to all the others. For further information 
about the Rio Treaty see CPDOC-FGV’s entry at: 
<http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/tratado-interamericano-de-assistencia-
reciproca-tiar>. Accessed at: 10/08/2019 
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reaffirming its bounds to the Pan-American system (Azevedo 2014, 45). It was implicit on the 
Conference calling the Hemisphere incompatibility with communism – Fidel Castro had just 
declared the Cuban revolution to be communist, on December 1961.9 
After the approval of the Colombian request, the Conference was schedule for January 
1962 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. It started on January 22nd and aimed “to consider the threats 
to the peace and the political independence of American states that might arise from the 
intervention of extracontinental powers directed toward breaking American solidarity”.10 
Throughout the meeting, the OAS members split into two groups: one led by the United States 
and mainly comprised of Central American countries (Cuban neighbors) demanded economic 
and diplomatic sanctions for the Island; while the second group, led by Brazil, was against such 
sanctions and called for a more diplomatic solution. To defend the illegality of these sanctions, 
Brasilia grounded its arguments on the principle of self-determination, meaning, each peoples’ 
right to choose their own form of government and social organization, without foreign 
intervention (Storrs 1973, 189). Brazil proposed a similar situation of Finland – turning the 
country into a geopolitically neutral state within the Cold War through a negative obligation 
agreement, just as Finland had done in 1948 in the European Cold War.11 However, at the end 
of the Conference, the OAS members decided for the removal of Cuba from both the OAS and 
the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).12 This was a relevant episode, since this decision 
happened with no grounds on the OAS charter, that didn’t foresee the removal of its members. 
Moreover, the decision was reached without the support of Latin America biggest countries: 
Argentina, Brazil,13 Chile and Mexico abstained from voting; thus, Cuba’s removal was 
approved by fourteen votes – the minimum necessary (Neto 2005, 2; Weis 2001, 334).14 
Scholars argue that the Punta del Este Conference was the first time Brazilian public 
opinion massively manifested about a foreign policy issue. According to these academics, 
Brazilian society started to polarize into two groups: the liberals and the independentists (or 
                                                     
9 For a further account of the Punta del Este Conference see Prado Jr (1961, 9-17).  
10 Final act of the VIII Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Available at: 
<http://www.oas.org/consejo/MEETINGS%20OF%20CONSULTATION/Actas/Acta%208.pdf>. 
Accessed at: 15/08/2019 
11 Such neutrality implied that Finland could not sign any economic or military agreement with neither 
the Soviet Union nor the United States (Avila 2011, 60). 
12 The negative obligation treaty allowed Cuba to keep its self-determination right, given that it didn’t 
sign any military alliance with hostile extracontinental powers (Storrs 1973, 318). 
13 Brazil believed that Cuba’s expulsion from the inter-American system would create a dangerous 
precedent, since it would create a background for the American countries to audit each other. Therefore, 
violating the principles of self-determination and non-intervention (Manzur 2014, 145). 
14 Última Hora (henceforth UH), Unidade da OEA contra comunismo e divergência sobre expulsão de 
Cuba, January 31st 1962, cover issue. 
The press and Brazilian Foreign Policy: Brazil’s…   353 
BJIR, Marília, v. 9, n. 2, p. 348-373, maio/ago. 2020. 
associationist-liberals and universal-independentists, respectively – in accordance with the 
terminology created by Manzur).15 Both groups expressed their views of how Brazil’s should 
develop its foreign policies. Liberals were favorable to foreign capital as the baseline for the 
country’s industrial development, therefore a closest relation to the U.S. was desirable. The 
independentists, on the other hand, criticized foreign investments and believed in a more 
autonomous development, besides closer relations with socialist and third world countries 
(Manzur 2009, 85; Cervo 2008, 17). 
According to Manzur, regarding the Cuban issue, the independentists were pro Cuba, 
while liberals defended the U.S. position. The author argues that independentists were against 
any kind of coercive solution against Cuba. The Island should be free to practice its sovereignty 
and its right to self-determination, once a violation of such rights would represent a threat to all 
the peoples of Latin America. The liberals, on the other hand, were favorable to American 
intervention in Cuba in order to guarantee the continent’s peace and security (Manzur 2009, 
140-141). Manzur also argues that it is essential to study the movements of Brazilian public 
opinion during the Quadros-Goulart period, since it was vastly fragmented and became one of 
the main aspects that led to the end of democracy in March 1964 (Manzur 2009, 83). According 
to the author, the Punta del Este Conference would be a strong example of Brazil’s public 
opinion polarization.  
Two distinctions must be made for the development of this study: the concept of public 
opinion and the period selected. We choose to analyze a portion of the public opinion barely 
studied on the Punta del Este Conference issue – the Brazilian press. As we couldn’t analyze in 
depth the whole universe of newspapers of that time, we choose to focus on three papers that 
represented the main positions of the Brazilian political spectrum (O Estado de São Paulo, 
Jornal do Brasil and Última Hora). These newspapers were chosen not only because of their 
political inclinations (conservative, moderate, leftist, respectively) but also because of their 
regional heterogeneity (cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro). We recognize that these 
newspapers can’t be taken as synonym of the whole Brazilian papers of the time, given that 
most of them probably were conservatives. However, we opted for analyzing the ones that 
                                                     
15 According to Manzur the administrations of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart witnessed a split of the 
public opinion into four groups: the associationist-liberals, the nationalist-liberals, the universal-
indepentists and the nationalist-radicals. The author argues that due to the national conjecture, between 
1961 and 1964 these groups gradually entered a polarization process. What ended fusing them into two 
groups ideologically distinguished: the liberal-associationists and the universal-independentists. For a 
further account of this classification see Manzur (2009, 88).  
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represented different opinions within the Brazilian society, in order to see how the whole 
political spectrum regarded the Punta del Este Conference matter.    
   Regarding the analyzed period, we decided to limit it between November 1961, when 
the Colombian proposal for the meeting was accepted, and March 1962, when president Goulart 
went to the United States in an official visit. This was the first great event for the Brazilian 
foreign policy after the Conference, therefore shifting the Brazilian press attention on foreign 
policy issues.16 At the 1960s decade, the Brazilian press was mostly written press and the radio. 
The newspapers at this time were financially struggling, just as the rest of the country. Still, the 
press was highly involved in the political life and struggles of the time. The newspapers chosen 
for this study were some among the many involved in politics. But why were they chosen? O 
Estado de São Paulo was one of the biggest rightist papers of the time, in addition Julio de 
Mesquita Filho (the newspaper owner) later connection to the 1964 coup. The Jornal do Brasil 
was chosen because of its non-spoken connection the Brazilian government. Finally, the Última 
Hora newspaper represented an innovation on the Brazilian press, since it was quicker and had 
several editions in a day. 
We recognize the difficulty of analyzing the public opinion by focusing only on national 
newspapers. Even though, they are important opinion makers – influencing those with power 
to press the government, alphabetized people who lived in the cities – newspapers present a 
limited perspective. First and foremost, they are companies with interests and political 
affiliations. This can be clearly observed in the case of O Estado de São Paulo, that adopted a 
strong anti-Goulart stance. At one point, Júlio de Mesquita Filho, owner of O Estado, became 
the main civil plotter of the movement that conspired to oust the Brazilian president and install 
a military government (Skidmore 1988, 274). Still, scholars argue that the newspapers are a 
vital source to access society’s views and opinions. According to Ambrose Akor, the press is 
essential to understand the relation between public opinion and foreign policy. He also 
emphasizes that mass media are connectors between policymakers and society. Whilst 
policymakers follow such medias to understand a portion of the public opinion, the press is the 
main source of information for the masses to know how the policymakers are acting (Akor 
2011, 36). 
Therefore, to bypass these limitations, we resorted to the cross-checking of sources by 
using newspapers of different editorial lines, political inclinations and relations with interest 
groups. To analyze the collected material, we applied a content analysis methodology presented 
                                                     
16 For a further account on Goulart’s trip to the United States see Skidmore (1988, 265). 
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by Krippendorff (2004). Firstly, we studied the report’s position in the paper – cover or inner 
pages, upper or bottom part of the page; besides analyzing the report’s type – news or editorial. 
These variables can not only reveal the importance given by the papers to the issue, but also the 
frequency they expressed their opinion about Brazil’s positions at the Conference. 
Thereafter, we identified the main political figures from Brazil, Cuba and the United 
States involved on the case – João Goulart, San Tiago Dantas, Fidel Castro, Ernesto Che 
Guevara, John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Dean Rusk – as well as the position their countries 
adopted at the Conference.17 For this analysis we identified and classified two types of 
adjectives: direct – beside the name or personal pronouns – and contextual. Direct adjectives 
are immediately identifiable and, in many occasions, brought strong qualifications to the 
political figures, both positive and negative. The contextual adjectives were subtler. Woven into 
the general context of the article, their analysis provided a better notion of the newspapers 
position about the issue they were reporting. This paper makes a thorough analysis of all the 
news and editorials about the Punta del Este Conference on the three selected newspapers. Our 
findings pointed to a smaller degree of polarization in Brazilian society and a considerable 
social support to the neutrality policy – what we interpreted as a proxy support to the 
Independent Foreign Policy (IFP).  
 
II. THE PRESS AND THE PUNTA DEL ESTE CONFERENCE 
  
The analysis of the three selected newspapers presented significant discrepancies 
between them. O Estado de São Paulo, for instance, kept a consistent analysis throughout the 
Punta del Este Conference period. The paper always showed its strong position against 
communism and the Fidel Castro government, and its favorable stance towards the United 
States, particularly regarding the need of harsher measures against Cuba. Conversely, the Jornal 
do Brasil adopted a more moderate line; even though it disapproved the political path chosen 
by the Castro government. The paper believed on the principles of non-intervention and self-
determination and was against any OAS enforcement measure towards Cuba. The Última Hora 
newspaper, in turn, defended the Cuban government positions and put forward a more critical 
position towards the decisions taken by the Punta del Este Conference. 
                                                     
17 Even though the other members of OAS were important participants and relevant to our analysis, 
given that our scope is to understand Brazil’s actions at the Conference, we choose to cluster them on 
one category.  
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 Regarding the quantitative analysis, between 1st of August 1961 and 31st of March 1962, 
we found a total of 498 articles about the Conference. From this amount, 234 (47% of the total 
amount) were from O Estado de São Paulo, 181 (36% of the total amount) from Jornal do 
Brasil, and 83 (17% of the total amount) from Última Hora. In terms of unit analysis, we could 
observe that in all three newspapers there were more articles than editorials about the 
Conference. O Estado de São Paulo presented a ratio of two to one, whereas the Jornal do 
Brasil four to one. The Última Hora newspaper didn’t have any editorial regarding the OAS 
Conference. This is an interesting outcome; even though it was expected the number of articles 
to surpass the editorials, the high proportion of editorials from O Estado de São Paulo shows 
the importance the paper gave to the Conference issue. Besides reporting it massively, O Estado 
de São Paulo repeatedly presented its position on the matter. In contrast, we were surprised to 
notice that Última Hora didn’t express its position clearly once. Therefore, we can infer that O 
Estado’s tendency to cover more international issues than domestic ones and Última Hora’s 
opposite tendency would explain this discrepancy. Nonetheless, given the issue’s relevance for 
Brazilian foreign policy and Última Hora’s representativeness to Brazil’s leftists it is worth 
noting the paper’s few editorials and clearly expressed opinions. 
Another surprising aspect was the low presence of manifestations from members of the 
civil society. Manifestations from the civil society in the newspapers were frequent, mainly on 
issues related to domestic public policies, such as the economy (Loureiro 2016a). We supposed 
the same would happen with foreign policy issues, but that was not the case. Among the selected 
papers, O Estado de São Paulo was the one that brought most of the civil society groups 
opinions. In 20 of their 234 news (9%) it ipisis litteris reported manifestations of scholars, the 
Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), londrinenses citizens and Brazilian 
ex-chancellors. It must be stressed, however, that their position was very similar to the one 
adopted by O Estado – criticizing Cuba or the stance taken by the Brazilian government. The 
Jornal do Brasil, on the other side, brought opinions from the civil society in only 5 of its 181 
news (3%). All of them were from sectors with different opinions from the paper, which shows 
its diversity. Finally, Última Hora didn’t bring a single manifestation from the civil society, 
what was surprising, given the newspaper’s strong relation to the urban worker’s movement. It 
should be mentioned, at this point, that the civil society manifestation is the first difference 
found from what some authors have written about the Conference. These scholars argued that 
the Punta del Este Conference was the first episode to have a high participation from civil 
society on the foreign policy debate (Neto 2005, Manzur 2009). However, as was seen in the 
newspapers, this participation was relatively low. 
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Regarding the news about the Conference per se, we observed that they were more 
frequent on the inner part of the newspaper than on the cover. In O Estado de São Paulo this 
ratio was two to one, whereas in Jornal do Brasil and Última Hora it was four to one. We also 
stress that these news were mostly located at the upper half of the page – O Estado de São 
Paulo and Jornal do Brasil had a proportion of three to one, while Última Hora two to one. 
Even though we found fewer news published on the cover, a big portion of them were placed 
on the upper part of the pages. Therefore, it can be understood that the Conference was not a 
secondary issue. 
About the variables “people” and “countries” we could observe that between all of the 
political figures analyzed the most mentioned were Fidel Castro and Brazil’s Minister of 
Foreign Relations, San Tiago Dantas. Meanwhile, the least cited was the Cuban Minister of 
Economy, Ernesto Che Guevara. Regarding the countries involved in the Conference, Cuba 
was the most mentioned, while the United States was the least one. On the variable 
“Conference”, where the before, during and post periods were analyzed, we verified a higher 
number of citations about the Conference per se than about its previous and subsequent months. 
The period that preceded the Conference, from its calling until it started, was classified 
negatively by two of the three newspapers (Jornal do Brasil and Última Hora), whereas the 
Conference was qualified as positive by the same ratio, only a different composition (O Estado 
de São Paulo and Jornal do Brasil). The two months after the Conference were one of the few 
common aspects among the newspapers: all of them classified the results of the Conference as 
positive, even though their motives differed. 
After presenting the general features of our study, we set off to a more specific analysis 
of the aforementioned factors. 
 
III. COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFERENCE 
 
Regarding the countries involved in the Punta del Este Conference, Cuba, as expected, 
was the most mentioned. It appeared in 84% of O Estado de São Paulo’s news, 81% of Jornal 
do Brasil, and 75% of Última Hora. Cuba had its actions and positions qualified as negative on 
the vast majority of both O Estado de São Paulo and Jornal do Brasil – 98% and 95% of the 
news, respectively. Among the several examples that could illustrate this scenario, we would 
like to mention an editorial from Jornal do Brasil which argued that the Cuban government 
knew how to “take advantage of the inter-American judicial apparatus that supported the 
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principles of non-intervention and self-determination” when it suited the country.18 It is 
interesting to notice how Cuba is described as an elusive political actor that was, supposedly, 
taking advantage of the inter-American system’s goodwill in order to obtain undeserved 
benefits. 
O Estado de São Paulo used an even darker tone when referring to Cuba. Replicating an 
editorial from the Argentinian newspaper La Nación about the Conference, O Estado, 
indirectly, stated that “the aggression, not only from communism as an ideology, but also from 
the Soviet bloc was developing on American soil.” According to the paper, “the free men from 
the continent (…) (were not expecting) ability, wit or opportunism. They (were expecting) 
solidarity.”19 There are several interesting points on this passage. It seems O Estado de São 
Paulo was opposing those who saw Brazil’s actions at the Punta del Este Conference as wise. 
Therefore, the idea implicit in the Estado excerpt is that when something bigger is at stake – 
the countries death under tyranny’s domination – it is not possible to act pragmatically. On the 
contrary, the states should act supportively towards those who needed it to survive, and the ones 
that didn’t agree with the United States at the Conference would, indirectly, be an accomplice 
to the Cuban people’s murder. Furthermore, O Estado clearly presents on this passage its 
perception that communism was an infiltration to be fought by what it considered the free men. 
In the Última Hora newspaper, Cuba is mostly qualified in a positive manner. It must be 
stressed, however, that these positive mentions regarded Cuba’s support of the Brazilian 
positions in Punta del Este. Attitudes such as intervention in other countries, shooting of 
American citizens, and violent reactions towards the press were condemned by the paper. 
Indirect positive mentions of Cuba can also be observed when Última Hora highlighted Cuban 
president Dorticós’ reference to Brazil. According to Dorticós, Cuba would accept the Brazilian 
suggestions “as ground for discussion, aiming a pan-American understanding.”20 Even though 
there were positive mentions about Cuba, we, initially, thought that percentage of citations 
regarding the Conference would be higher, given that its main topic was the Cuban issue. 
Finally, the least mentioned country in all three newspaper was the United States.21 
Última Hora and Jornal do Brasil mentioned Washington in only 30% and 43% of their news, 
respectively. Both classified the American positions negatively. The Última Hora newspaper 
                                                     
18 Jornal do Brasil (henceforth JB), Cuba: uma opção, December 30th 1961, p. 6. 
19 O Estado de São Paulo (henceforth OESP), Cuba: opor-se-ia o Uruguai à convocação dos chanceleres, 
November 21st 1961, p. 13. 
20 UH, Cuba aceita (em princípio) plano do Brasil, January 24th 1962, p. 6.  
21 This result does not account for the unitary analysis of OAS other members, that were clustered in 
one category.  
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had a percentage of 88% of negative mentions to the United States, even though it had only a 
few direct mentions to Washington. The paper biggest critic regarding the United States was 
towards its interventionist policy. This can be clearly observed in one of its reports where it 
reproduced an article from Faure Chomon, then Cuba’s ambassador in Moscow, stating that 
Washington’s intentions of intervening in Cuba, just as they had tried in 1961 on the Bay of 
Pigs, were “so evidently that it would be futile to underline its illegal character.” 22  
In the case of Jornal do Brasil, despite its mentions to the U.S. being majorly negative, 
the percentage difference between positive and negative citations is only 3%. Whilst 
complementing the United States’ general objectives, Jornal do Brasil criticized the means 
used to achieve them. The paper went as far as directly saying this at an article: “in Punta del 
Este the governments of Brazil and the United States are in open divergency, although both are 
chasing the same goals.” 23 – peace and the maintenance of a Latin America free from the 
communist threat. Thus, we can observe that, even though being contrary to communism, 
Jornal do Brasil wasn’t in favor of protecting the inter-American system through mandatory 
sanctions or the Cuban expulsion of the OAS. 
In the O Estado de São Paulo, the U.S. were mentioned in 41% of the articles and their 
actions were mostly qualified as positive (89%). The paper praises U.S’ resolute positions and 
emphasizes the country’s willingness to yield within reasonable limits, yet still maintaining 
their determination to condemn the Cuban government on a manner other than “merely moral, 
but justified on reasons of practical order.” 24 This passage showcases that O Estado de São 
Paulo strongly agreed with the American stance of seeking a conviction that brought concrete 
implications to Cuba, and not only moral ones. 
 
IV. POLITICAL FIGURES OF THE CONFERENCE 
 
The political figures most mentioned by the papers related to the Punta del Este 
Conference news were Fidel Castro (in O Estado de São Paulo and Jornal do Brasil) and San 
Tiago Dantas (in Jornal do Brasil and Última Hora). O Estado de São Paulo mentioned the 
Cuban leader in almost half of its articles (44%), classifying both his persona and actions 
negatively. An interesting example is its January 4th 1962 editorial that described Fidel as “the 
                                                     
22 UH, Punta del Este: a voz de Cuba será acusadora, January 10th 1962, p. 6. 
23 JB, Brasil e Estados Unidos querem as mesmas coisas, mas estão em desacordo, January 17th 1962, 
p. 4. 
24 OESP, Em lugar de sanções contra Cuba os Chanceleres expulsariam ou suspenderiam seu governo 
da OEA, January 24th 1962, cover issue. 
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bearded puppet of Nikita Kruschev” that had made clear his strategy towards the Americas, 
“better yet, the part attributed to him by the planners of the Soviet strategy on the Cold War.”25 
Thus, we can observe how O Estado qualified Fidel Castro as a voiceless political figure, a kind 
of puppet of Moscow. What coincided with Washington’s views at the time: the non-
intervention principle wasn’t applicable to the Island, given that Havana was being manipulated 
by a foreign power. According to Avila “Castro’s, and the other revolutionaries, growing 
dependence of the Soviet Union and the old Cuban communist revolutionaries would end up 
generating a sovietization process, putting Castro’s charismatic leadership at risk” (Avila 2011, 
61). 
In Jornal do Brasil, Castro appeared in 38% of the news related to the Punta del Este 
Conference. Just as O Estado, the Cuban leader was mostly qualified negatively, besides being 
characterized as a soviet puppet quite often. In its December 5th 1961 editorial, Jornal do Brasil 
described Castro as a “typical Latin American revolutionary”. Another example was after 
Castro issued a statement declaring the new Cuban regime to be communist, the paper argued 
that he had become a “bureaucrat subservient to the Cuban Communist Party orientations”.26 
In the case of Última Hora, even though Castro was referred to in only 13% of the news 
(a fairly lower percentage than the other newspapers), he was presented mostly in a positive 
manner. One of Castro’s action that was regarded by the paper as positive was his possible 
decision to free political prisoners and the provision of safe conducts to his government’s 
opponents. By considering these measures as answers to the accusations made by the OAS 
Inter-American Peace Commission, Última Hora saw this as an act of good faith from Castro. 
Besides, unlike the other newspapers, Última Hora didn’t portray the Cuban leader as a 
Moscow puppet. It must be stressed that the paper’s little reference to Castro shows its worries 
for the Cuban issue as a whole, and not only with its political leader figure.27 
The second political figure most mentioned by the newspapers was the Brazilian 
chancellor San Tiago Dantas. Brazil’s representative at the Punta del Este Conference, Dantas 
was the front men of the Independent Foreign Policy on this episode (Storrs 1973, 115). The 
chancellor defended the self-determination and non-intervention principles and supported the 
Cuban people’s right to choose their own form of government without foreign intervention. 
Therefore, it is implied that Dantas didn’t believe Castro’s administration should be treated as 
a Moscow puppet just for being communist (Neto 2005, 17). For O Estado, however, Dantas 
                                                     
25 OESP, Fidel Castro e Punta del Este, January 4th 1962, p. 3.  
26 JB, Malogro, December 5th 1961, p. 6. 
27 UH, Punta del Este: Conferência começa hoje, January 22nd 1962, p. 6. 
The press and Brazilian Foreign Policy: Brazil’s…   361 
BJIR, Marília, v. 9, n. 2, p. 348-373, maio/ago. 2020. 
and his positions – which were mentioned in 32% of its news – were considered negative. On 
one of the paper’s editorials, published weeks before the Conference, the chancellor’s 
argumentation was qualified as an “oratory excess” that supported an “indefensible position”.28 
We infer that the “indefensibility” of such position resided on what the paper believed to be the 
non-sovereign characteristic of a communist Cuba. 
Jornal do Brasil gave more emphasis to San Tiago Dantas than O Estado – 38% of the 
news (same percentage as Castro). However, unlike Castro, the Brazilian chancellor and his 
positions were positively qualified every time he was mentioned. A good example is the paper’s 
description of Brazil’s positions at the Conference after its end. The meeting’s results were seen 
as positive by Jornal do Brasil and were directly attributed to Dantas, who was pointed as “a 
man of great culture and intelligence”.29 Another article that illustrates Jornal do Brasil’s 
position is its publishing of a telegram sent by Dantas himself to the newspaper praising its 
“support to the independentist policy carried out by the Brazilian delegation at the Punta del 
Este Conference”.30 It is interesting to notice how Jornal do Brasil implicitly legitimized the 
Brazilian position at the meeting due to Dantas’ wisdom and intellectuality; as if any right (or 
wrong) position could be determined by its formulator mastery or lack of knowledge. Última 
Hora was the newspaper to most mention Dantas (51% of all their Conference news) – all of 
which were positive. On the cover of the January 26th 1962 issue the paper stated that “San 
Tiago Dantas’ resolution was a sensation at Punta del Este”.31 
The political figure least mentioned by all three newspapers was Ernesto Che Guevara. 
Then Cuba’s Minister for the Economy, Guevara was referred to in only 1% of O Estado de 
São Paulo and Jornal do Brasil’s news; Última Hora didn’t mention the Minister once. Both 
papers that mentioned him did so in a negative manner. O Estado de São Paulo cited Guevara 
in an article about president’s Dorticós speech at the Conference as being aggressive and 
impetuous.32 Jornal do Brasil showed Guevara as an “old Argentinian communist” – what the 
paper considered to be negative.33 O Estado also quoted one of the Minister’s statement saying 
that “there wouldn’t be any moment of rest in the production and construction of socialism.”34 
                                                     
28 OESP, As “forças ocultas” do chanceler, February 9th 1962, p. 3. 
29 JB, A verdade sobre San Thiago Dantas, February 2nd 1962, p. 3. 
30 JB, San Tiago agradece o apoio do JB, February 2nd 1962, p. 3. 
31 UH, Firmeza de San Tiago Dantas faz sensação em Punta del Este, January 26th 1962, cover issue. 
32 OESP, Texto do discurso de Dorticós na Comissão Geral da Conferência, January 27th 1962, p. 2. 
33 JB, Stevenson em Trinidad para encontrar-se com o Presidente Frondizi, November 26th 1961, p. 2. 
34 OESP, Fidel convoca reunião latino-americana para o dia 22 em Havana, January 9th 1962, cover 
issue. 
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The paper contextualized this quotation negatively, as if this eternal construction of socialism 
needed to be stopped for the benefit of mankind. 
The official representative of Cuba at the Punta del Este Conference was the country’s 
president, Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado – that is why he was always alluded when the Cuban 
delegation was mentioned. Despite this, the absence of citations of Che Guevara seems relevant, 
since Guevara was one of the biggest and most visible figures in the Cuban government. His 
name was fairly known at the time and he even caused a strong discussion in Brazil after being 
awarded with a Cruzeiro do Sul medal by president Quadros in August 1961(Skidmore 1988, 
247). 
Besides Guevara, there are other political figures involved, directly or indirectly, in the 
Conference that were barely mentioned. One of them is the Brazilian president João Goulart. O 
Estado de São Paulo only referred to Goulart in 4% of all of their Conference news, and all of 
them in a negative way. One example is the paper’s editorial of December 8th 1961 in which 
Goulart is criticized for following an independent foreign policy instead of resuming a more 
traditional policy of alignment with the United States.35 On Jornal do Brasil the same 
phenomenon happened – Goulart was mentioned in only 5% of the news. However, the 
newspaper’s mentions to the president and his decisions were all positive. Última Hora, by its 
turn, referred to Goulart in 10% of its news, and, as Jornal do Brasil, all of them were positive. 
The paper emphasized Goulart’s thorough attention while following the Conference’s36 debates 
while Jornal do Brasil praised the president for keeping friendly and courteous relations with 
the Cuban representative.37 
Another political figure quite relevant, but barely mentioned, was the American president 
John F. Kennedy. O Estado de São Paulo referred to Kennedy in only 20% of its total 
Conference news, and both the president and his positions were considered positive. It must be 
stressed that, even though Kennedy was less mentioned than Castro and Dantas by O Estado, 
the American president appeared more than Brazilian president João Goulart. Among the 
paper’s news that illustrate its flattering characterization of Kennedy, one of the president’s 
statements, reproduced by O Estado, drew our attention. Kennedy argued that “there should be 
a general agreement at the Hemisphere considering communism a threat supported by 
                                                     
35 OESP, O Brasil e o comunismo em Cuba, December 8th 1961, p. 3. 
36 OESP, O Brasil e o comunismo em Cuba, December 8th 1961, p. 3. 
37 JB, Dorticós, após ouvir Goulart: Brasil é contra intervenção, January 21st 1962, p. 5. 
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extracontinental forces”.38 It is interesting to observe how O Estado emphasized the statement 
that coincided with its position about Cuba and why the Island should suffer OAS sanctions.   
In Jornal do Brasil, president Kennedy was mentioned in 14% of the news (far more 
then president João Goulart), and most of them were positive (54%). The paper argued that 
Kennedy was quite popular in the Hemisphere, although it didn’t provide any empirical 
evidence for such allegation.39 Última Hora was the one to least mention the American 
president (only 7% of their news), and he was qualified negatively on all of them. As was 
expected, Última Hora was the only paper among the three selected to mention more president 
João Goulart then Kennedy – 10% and 7%, respectively. 
Among Última Hora’s news critical of Kennedy, we can emphasize its characterization 
of the American leader as a “young president” that “didn’t know how to resist the pressures of 
pro-interventionists elements” of his government.40 Here, we must stress two aspects of Última 
Hora’s qualification of Kennedy. First, we observed, once again, how the critics or 
compliments towards some of the Conference’s leaders were grounded on the lack (or presence) 
of their knowledge and/or experience. If Dantas was characterized by Última Hora and Jornal 
do Brasil as experienced, cult and intelligent – what was used as ground to explain his positions 
– Kennedy’s alleged lack of experience would explain his lack of conditions to resist the 
pressures of those interventionists elements in Washington. Secondly, just as O Estado 
qualified Fidel as a Moscow puppet, Última Hora indicates that Kennedy was being 
manipulated by U.S.’ interest groups. 
Another political figure little mentioned, but greatly relevant to the Conference, was 
then American Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The secretary represented the United States at the 
Punta del Este meeting and had an important part in maneuvering the other members of the 
OAS in order to achieve a harsher solution against Cuba. However, Rusk only appeared in 20% 
of O Estado and Jornal do Brasil news. He and his positions were classified positively in both 
newspapers. Even though being little portrayed on the Conference news, Rusk was more 
mentioned than president Goulart, for example. O Estado de São Paulo praised a speech where 
Rusk instigated the Latin American nations to “establish a shield through which they could 
adopt constructive measure (…) to eradicate communism’s foundations (from the Hemisphere) 
– poverty, hunger and ignorance”.41 The Jornal do Brasil newspaper, on the other hand, showed 
                                                     
38 OESP, Kennedy otimista acerca da reunião de Punta del Este, January 16th 1962, cover issue. 
39 JB, Não será fácil ao Presidente Kennedy movimentar a Aliança, December 30th 1961, p. 7. 
40 UH, Kennedy: um ano de governo, January 22nd 1962, p. 6. 
41 OESP, Dean Rusk mobiliza as Américas contra a subversão castrista e as forças que atrasam o 
progresso, January 26th 1962, cover issue. 
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Rusk’s views of Brazil’s position at the Conference and its domestic situation. The Secretary 
of State stated “U.S.’ great worries would be the possibility of a social upheaval in Brazil”.42 
Lastly, Última Hora mentioned Rusk in 17% of their news regarding the Conference, and 
mostly in a negative way (82%). A good example is Última Hora’s article classifying Rusk as 
disrespectful for not wearing the translation headphones to listen to Dorticós’ speech. 
According to the paper, the Secretary “just simply stood there, without moving, looking to the 
space from where the Cuban president was speaking.”43 
Another relevant aspect for our analysis is the number of direct quotations to political 
figures speeches. Although some speeches were clipped, what may have generated different 
meanings from the ones originally intended, we considered that the speeches chosen by the 
newspapers were a good indicator of their position towards the political figure in question. Even 
being considerably mentioned by Jornal do Brasil, Fidel Castro doesn’t have many direct 
quotations – only in two articles.  These quotations were used to support the paper’s claims that 
Castro’s speeches were violent. An interesting example is a citation of Castro’s statement about 
Rômulo Betancourt, Venezuela’s president, after the rupture of diplomatic relations between 
both countries. The Cuban leader called Betancourt a “miserable instrument of Yankee 
imperialism.”44 
Even though Última Hora was aligned with the left wing of the political spectrum, the 
paper directly quoted Castro in only two of its news. The paper used Castro’s speeches to 
endorse its positive qualification of the Cuban leader. One example is the Cuban leader’s 
speech, declaring that country wasn’t in favor of war and that “our wish is not to have weapons. 
Our politics is non-aggressive.” 45 Given that one of U.S. strongest critic against Cuba was 
towards its alleged sponsorship of other Latin American revolutionary groups, this kind of 
quotation was brought forward to qualify the Cuban leader in a positive manner and to, 
indirectly, answer the aforementioned critic (Neto 2005, 9). 
Finally, O Estado de São Paulo was the one with the most direct quotations of the Cuban 
leader, a total of 5 news – the second biggest number of quotations of any political figure in our 
research. This paper used the citations to characterize what it considered a violent speech. In 
the meeting context, O Estado quoted Castro saying that “everything that resembled 
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43 UH, Possível acordo (hoje) em Punta del Este, January 27th 1962, p. 4. 
44 JB, EUA pedem apoio a uma ação contra Cuba, November 18th 1961, p. 7. 
45 UH, Fidel: “Brasil não aliena sua dignidade”, January 3rd 1962, p. 6 
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interventionism was going to be received by cannonballs”.46 It is interesting to observe how, 
unlikely Última Hora, O Estado not only characterizes Castro negatively, but also presents 
elements that confirm Cuba’s alleged aggressive policy at the Hemisphere – therefore, 
constituting a menace to the inter-American system. 
Among all the political figures analyzed, San Tiago Dantas was the one with most 
references to his speeches. O Estado de São Paulo directly quoted his words on twelve of its 
news, while Jornal do Brasil on nine and Última Hora five. O Estado de São Paulo mostly 
used Dantas’ speeches to try disavowing the chancellor’s arguments. For example, when 
mentioning Dantas’ proposal for the neutralization of Cuba, the paper quoted his words saying 
that this neutralization would be a “constructive solution that represented the reintegration of 
Cuba on the inter-American system, even though in a ‘sui generis’ position and without that 
country giving up the communist regime installed by Mr. Fidel Castro.47 Keeping in mind the 
negative characterization O Estado had from the communist regime, this mention brings a 
negative nuance to San Tiago Dantas’ position. 
The Jornal do Brasil newspaper, on the other hand, directly quoted the chancellor to 
show its support for Brazil’s position at the Conference. On its January 30th 1962, at the end of 
the meeting, the paper quoted Dantas’ words saying that “we (Brazil) couldn’t help the United 
States to make a mistake just because they think they are fixing another.”48 With this citation 
the paper implicitly argued that defending a position different from the United States was not 
the same as defending communism in Cuba. Última Hora also used Dantas’ quotations to 
reaffirm the Independent Foreign Policy as a positive one. Of all the quotations found only one 
is not among the chancellor’s interviews about foreign policy issues. However, this one can be 
considered one of the most relevant to comprehend the paper’s position regarding the Brazilian 
stance at the Conference. By quoting that “Brazil (would keep) declaring the lack of legal 
ground at the OAS charter for the adoption of such measures against Cuba”49 Última Hora 
showed its opposition towards the Conference final decision. 
It came to our attention the absence of direct citations of, then Brazilian president, João 
Goulart on the Conference news in all three newspapers. O Estado de São Paulo and Última 
Hora did not directly quote any of Goulart’s statements, whereas Jornal do Brasil, quoted one. 
On this citation the paper reinforced the president’s position – considered positive – by bringing 
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24th 1962, p. 2. 
47 OESP, O Brasil proporá a “institucionalização” da situação de Cuba, January 12th 1962, back cover. 
48 JB, San Tiago: Brasil não ajudará EUA a errarem de novo, January 30th 1962, p. 4. 
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his statement that Brazil would respect the non-intervention and self-determination principles 
“despite the profound ideological and political divergencies between the two governments”.50 
It was startling to notice that Última Hora didn’t give João Goulart any space for direct 
quotation, moreover because of its support for the president’s position. 
 
V. PERIODS OF THE CONFERENCE 
 
 In order to understand each Conference moment representativeness on the press cover, 
we chose to divide this event on three time periods. The first is the period that preceded the 
Conference, from November 10th 1961 (the date of the Conference’s calling); the Conference 
per se from January 22nd 1962 to January 30th 1962; and the two months following the end of 
the Conference. Therefore, we assumed as the end parameter the trip the Brazilian president 
João Goulart made to the U.S. at the end of March 1962 – another important event for the 
Brazilian foreign policy. 
 At O Estado de São Paulo, the Conference calling and preparations were cited only a 
few times, and these mentions were completely positive. This means the Conference only 
became relevant to the paper after it began. Once again, our findings counter-arguments some 
of the scholars who argue that the VIII Consultation meeting had been a moment of great public 
opinion participation in foreign policy. Amongst the few times O Estado manifested itself 
regarding the pre-Conference context (18%), we should emphasize its article about Peru’s 
support to the Colombian proposal to “holding an inter-American ministerial meeting in order 
to analyze the occidental hemisphere defense problem in face of the communist threat.” 51 It 
can be observed that from the beginning the paper was clear about its opposition to communism. 
Thus, it considered the calling for the Punta del Este Conference a very important measure, 
given that the meeting would discuss the alleged communist threat. 
On Jornal do Brasil and Última Hora, the month that preceded the Conference had more 
mentions – 24% and 36%, respectively. Both papers considered the calling of the Conference 
as a negative measure and were against it, once they believed this summoning could weaken 
the inter-American unity. A good example is Jornal do Brasil’s categorization of this 
conference calling as an “untimely action”. 52 Última Hora newspaper was even more direct by 
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asserting that the Colombian request for a consultation meeting had been poorly formulated, 
once the summoning, on the way it was put forward, represented a risk to the inter-American 
system integrity. According to the paper, even if the continent’s political situation demanded 
such a meeting “Bogota’s proposal should be better formulated juridically, in order to, 
effectively, invoke the Rio de Janeiro Treaty.”53 
Regarding the Conference period, Última Hora presented a low number of citations 
(35%), all of them negative. Once again, the little representativeness of the meeting on the news 
of one of the country’s most important leftist newspaper was startling. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting to notice how the paper kept describing the Conference as a tense environment; 
going from a “cautious optimism” to an “open preoccupation”54 Meanwhile, O Estado de São 
Paulo and Jornal do Brasil mentioned the Conference a lot – both in 56% of their articles –, 
considering it a positive movement. O Estado de São Paulo believed the meeting to be positive 
because, as stated by the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk, its participants were “willing 
to reaffirm the main foundations of the inter-American system, to declare that Cuba had violated 
these principles and to condemn the aforementioned country for having abandoned the 
Hemisphere”55 Therefore, it can be seen the paper’s inclinations towards a harsher 
condemnation for Cuba. The Jornal do Brasil, on the other hand, recognized that the 
Conference was being positive and reaching “an agreement regarding the measures to be 
collectively taken in order to prevent Castro’s influence from penetrating in the Hemisphere.”56  
Finally, the two months after the meeting and its results were the least mentioned by all 
three newspapers. The results achieved by the Conference were considered positive by all the 
selected papers. O Estado de São Paulo mentioned the Conference’s results in 18% of its total 
reports, classifying them as positive in 78% of these articles. Even though the paper was in 
favor of harsher measures against Cuba, such as military, political and economic sanctions, it 
was satisfied with Cuba’s expulsion from the OAS. O Estado believed that this measure would 
protect the inter-American system from a “communist threat”. This can be observed on its 
editorial of February 2nd 1962 about the San Rafael declaration – resolution approved at the end 
of the Conference.57 The paper saw this declaration as a projection of the “whole Hemisphere 
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(Avila 2011, 62). 
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as an impregnable fortress of world democracy.” 58 Interestingly, this was very close to the 
American government position about the meeting: the Hemisphere had obtained a victory 
against totalitarianism, given that Cuba would no longer be a sovereign country since it declared 
its adherence to communism and was under Soviet influence. However, Cuba’s expulsion from 
the OAS would protect the American countries from this totalitarian threat and defend the 
democratic regimes. 
Jornal do Brasil, in its turn, mentioned the post-Conference period and its results in 
only 10% of its news, qualifying it positively in 54% of them. We could observe that on this 
newspaper the Conference results’ approval ratio was lower. This is due to the paper’s defense 
of the non-intervention and self-determination principles – what didn’t happen at the meeting, 
given Cuba’s expulsion of the OAS for being communist. Despite that, Jornal do Brasil saw 
this outcome as a positive one, as can be noted in Dantas’ words, quoted by the newspaper, 
asserting that the Conference was “a victory for the Hemisphere and a statement from the 
American countries on the fight of democracy versus the international communism.”59 
Finally, the Última Hora newspaper alluded to the post-Conference period in 16% of its 
articles, all of which were qualified in a positive manner. Just as Jornal do Brasil, Última Hora 
supported the Brazilian delegation position against the Cuban expulsion from the OAS. 
Nevertheless, the paper classified in a very positive way the results of the Conference, even 
though always emphasizing its disapproval about the means used to reach this result. The fact 
that the Cuban expulsion happened even with the abstention of the bigger Latin American 
countries was considered by Última Hora extremely negative for the inter-American system – 
even if it meant a legitimacy defeat for Washington. This can be seen in Dórticos’ statement 
about the Conference, reproduced by the newspaper, when he argues that the U.S. had “under 
covered their downgraded position, having to back away and accept minimal results at the 
expense of the inter-American system.” 60 Therefore, even though Úlitma Hora considered 
Cuba’s expulsion a drastic measure, it saw this as a lighter result that the sanctions that were 
being considered. It must also be stressed that the newspaper regarded this as a victory of “Latin 
America’s democratic conscience”, given that the biggest democracies of the continent, except 
for the United States, abstained from voting on the matter at the OAS.61 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 After analyzing O Estado de São Paulo, O Jornal do Brasil and Última Hora, we could 
observe the presence of a few common characteristics. One aspect that was clearly noticed in 
all three newspapers was the formation of two different opinion groups. The first was against 
Cuba and all it represented for the hemisphere, while the second one was less critical of the 
Island and understood that its choice of social organization would not necessarily have an 
impact on the inter-American system. It must be stressed, however, that within each group we 
could also find some diverging positions, mainly regarding the best policy Brazil should adopt 
towards Cuba. In the first group, we have O Estado de São Paulo and Jornal do Brasil, both 
against Castro and the paths Cuba had been taking, such as the expropriation of goods belonging 
to American companies and the shooting of American citizens. Nevertheless, on the issue of 
Brazil’s position at the Conference they disagree; whilst O Estado de São Paulo was against 
Brazil’s and San Tiago Dantas’ positions, Jornal do Brasil was in favor of both. The second 
group was composed by Última Hora and also by Jornal do Brasil, given that both agreed with 
Brazil’s foreign policy towards Cuba and defended the non-intervention and self-determination 
principles. Just as the first group, this one had divergencies among itself, but this time 
concerning Castro’s attitudes. 
 The first group can be placed on the right side of the political spectrum, while the second 
one on the left side. It must be stated that all newspapers have more mentions to the countries 
as a whole, than to its political figures. When a country is presented as one as if it were a unity 
within which everybody agrees, several opinions are silenced. Nevertheless, as was shown by 
the newspapers, this was not the case. In some news it is perceptible that some decisions would 
not have the support of the civil society or even of other politicians. Two great examples are 
the Organização Regional Interamericana de Trabalhadores – ORIT (Inter-American 
Regional Organization of Workers) and the Brazilian chancellors case. ORIT sent a message to 
the Brazilian delegation at Punta del Este Conference asking for stronger measures against 
Cuba. They claimed not to believe in the reestablishment of continental harmony if “the OAS 
didn’t take, and governments didn’t follow, measures aiming the definitive banishment of 
everything that meant despotism and despise for the human being from the American 
countries”.62 This passage shows another regional organization, with representatives from 
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several countries present at the Conference, disagreeing from some of their countrymen 
positions and defending what they thought was the best way to deal with communism.63 
As to the case of the ex-chancellors, it emphasizes the divergences that can happen 
within a country. Four Brazilian ex-chancellors – João Neves da Fontoura (January 1951 – June 
1953), Vicente Rao (July 1953 – August 1954), José Carlos de Macedo Soares (November 1955 
– June 1958) and Horácio Lafer (August 1959 – January 1961) – sent the government a 
memorandum asking for the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba and its removal of the 
OAS. These chancellors were against communism and argued that, although there was no need 
for the use of force, “if we want to keep the Organization of the American States and act as 
barrier to communism invasion” the Latin American countries would have to find “a solution 
that preserved the unity of our republics, renewed faith in democracy and liberty and our 
abhorrence to totalitarianism.” Once again, it is noticeable how arbitrary it is to treat a country 
as a unitary actor.64 
Finally, we could not observe a polarization process of the Brazilian press about the 
Punta del Este Conference issue when divided by political affiliation. As previously asserted, 
we recognize that these newspapers can’t be taken as synonym of the universe of Brazilian 
papers of the time, given that most of them probably were conservatives.  Even though we stress 
the representativeness of our sample. As presented above, the newspapers were chosen from a 
sample that would represent the political spectrum of the Brazilian society at the time 
(conservative, moderate and leftist). Therefore, the sample does not represent the whole 
universe of newspapers, given that there were more conservative ones at the time. However, 
through the analysis of these newspapers, we were able to see how different positions of the 
political spectrum saw Brazil’s participation at the Punta del Este Conference. On one side, a 
clear dissonance could be seen between O Estado de São Paulo and Última Hora, being each 
of them on one end of the political spectrum. On the other side, however, excluding the general 
dissatisfaction with communism, we could observe a greater support for the Independent 
Foreign Policy and Brazil’s positions at the Punta del Este Conference.  
                                                     
63 The Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers was created in 1951 as a regional affiliate of 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). On the 1950s ICFTU/ORIT established 
one of their offices in Rio de Janeiro. Its purpose was to gather commercial unities against the Soviet 
Union (Colistete 2012, 669). Therefore, since its creation ORIT had a strong relation with the United 
States government.  
64 OESP, Quatro ex-chanceleres pedem a condenação de Cuba em Punta del Este, January 18th 1962, 
back cover. 
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We must also highlight the only common aspect to all three newspapers; the results of 
the Conference. All of them agreed that the results achieved at the Punta del Este Conference 
were positive, even though for different reasons. O Estado de São Paulo hoped for harsher 
measures against Cuba but was satisfied with the Island’s removal from the OAS and IADB. 
The newspaper saw this as a protective measure for the inter-American system. Defending the 
principles of non-intervention and self-determination, Jornal do Brasil also qualified this as a 
good outcome, however, less than O Estado de São Paulo. The paper considered this a positive 
result, once it represented a victory of the hemisphere over communism. Finally, Última Hora, 
which was against the removal of Cuba, called this a positive outcome. Última Hora stressed 
and disapproved the fact that this resolution was approved without the favorable votes of some 
of the major Latin American countries, but still, considered it less drastic than it could have 
been.  
As stressed at the beginning of the paper, the newspapers represent only a part of the 
public opinion, and therefore, shouldn’t be taken as a synonym of the whole. Nevertheless, our 
aim with this study was to analyze this portion of the Brazilian public opinion and understand 
how they saw Brazil’s participation at the Punta del Este Conference. After a careful analysis, 
we were able to observe some opposition to the Brazilian positions at the Punta del Este 
Conference, mainly from O Estado de São Paulo, but still a great support for the Brazil’s 
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